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Abstract
While corporate philanthropy has been considered a firm’s reputation management activity, less research has focused on
the relationship between CEOs as the ultimate decision maker and corporate philanthropy, particularly when organi-
zational crises occur. To fill this research gap, this study examines certain CEO characteristics (such as founder status and
CEO network) and two causes of philanthropy (such as business-related philanthropy and cause-related philanthropy).
This study suggests that there will be a positive relationship between these characteristics of CEOs and causes of cor-
porate philanthropy, and organizational crises will moderate that relationship. This study contributes to a new conceptual
framework to explore the relationship between CEO characteristics and different corporate philanthropic causes fol-
lowing organizational crises. This study discusses the scholarly suggestions of our conceptual framework and concludes
with implications for future research.
Keywords
corporate philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, CEO characteristics, organizational crisis
Introduction
The importance of corporate philanthropy continues to be a
topic of intense debate among both scholars and practi-
tioners. On the one hand, corporate philanthropy can
enhance a firm’s reputation, thereby improving perfor-
mance among key stakeholders (Fombrun and Shanley,
1990; Godfrey, 2005; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Wang and
Qian, 2011; Williams and Barrett, 2000). On the other
hand, there is a pessimistic perspective about a firm’s phi-
lanthropic engagement by arguing that a firm exists primar-
ily to generate economic returns, not to solve societal
problems (e.g. corporate charitable giving to poverty and
hunger) (Devinney, 2009; Friedman, 1970; Vaaland et al.,
2008). Despite this discrepancy, firms engage in corporate
philanthropy because it helps to fulfill humanitarian needs
and firms also believe in the notion, ‘‘doing well by doing
good.’’ Therefore, it can be suggested that corporate phi-
lanthropy should be an important business goal of the firm.
In addition to benevolent characteristics, firms tend
to use corporate philanthropy strategically to enhance
business benefits from their philanthropic contributions.
Strategic philanthropy can play a key role in developing
value-creating relationships with primary stakeholders,
enhancing a firm’s image, and developing the support of
local government (Brammer and Millington, 2005; Lii and
Lee, 2012; Saiia et al., 2003). Stakeholder theory provides a
theoretical foundation by indicating that socially favorable
activities are a requirement for maintaining business legiti-
macy and are positively associated with a firm’s perfor-
mance over the long term (Freeman, 1984). Importantly,
firms strategically use corporate philanthropy to maintain a
good reputation and repair a bad reputation caused by cor-
porate crises. It is suggested that firms use their philanthro-
pic engagement specifically when executives feel
organizational pressure1 caused by corporate crises. Past
research suggests that corporate philanthropy can mitigate
the risks of reputational losses and secure critical resources
from stakeholders, hence, providing insurance-like protec-
tion to stakeholders (Godfrey, 2005). From this phenom-
enon, it is suggested that corporate philanthropy can be
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used a strategic tool for enhancing a firm’s reputation
which is positively related to business legitimacy.
Despite the extensive discussions of a firm’s perspective
on philanthropy (Godfrey, 2005; Wang and Qian, 2011),
how corporate executives utilize their firm’s philanthropy
has not received much attention. Among corporate execu-
tives (senior executives and board members), CEOs have
prominent roles in deciding a firm’s philanthropic engage-
ment. They tend to think strategically about philanthropy to
enhance brand name recognition, employee productivity,
and even to overcome regulatory obstacles (Seifert et al.,
2003; Smith, 1994). Despite an important role of CEOs on
corporate philanthropy, the relationship between CEO char-
acteristics and corporate philanthropy seems underdeve-
loped (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Marquis and Lee, 2013). It has
been suggested that corporate philanthropy becomes a stra-
tegic tool that CEOs implement for instilling customer loy-
alty, enhancing employee morale, and building community
relations (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Importantly, CEOs are
the primary decision maker of the organization so that an
examination of CEOs’ attitudes and values toward philan-
thropy can provide needed insight into the social responsi-
bility actions in general and philanthropic function in
particular (Dennis et al., 2009; Wood, 1991). From this phe-
nomenon, it is suggested that more scholarly effort should be
given the relationship between CEO characteristics and cor-
porate philanthropy.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship
between CEO characteristics and corporate philanthropy,
particularly when organizational crises occur. Specifically,
this study focuses on the relationship between certain CEO
characteristics (such as founder status and CEO network)
and causes of philanthropy (such as business-related phi-
lanthropy (BRP) and non-BRP). Past research suggests that
CEO network is strategically valuable to firms (Geletka-
nycz and Boyd, 2011; Mizruchi, 1996). CEOs have two
types of network (such as intensive network within their
industry and extensive network outside their industry) to
gain better information from external environment
(Ozman, 2006; Rowley and Baum, 2008). In addition, past
research suggests that a firm’s charitable contributions
have specific objectives (e.g. either business gains or social
benefits) (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Throughout a theore-
tical comparison of CEO characteristics and causes of phi-
lanthropy, this study suggests that there will be a certain
relationship between CEO characteristics (such as founder
status and CEO network) and causes of philanthropy and
the relationship will change, particularly when organiza-
tional crises occur.
This study attempts to answer two research questions.
First, what is the relationship between CEO characteristics
(such as founder status and CEO network) and causes of
philanthropy? Second, what is the role of organizational
crises on that relationship? This study contributes to a new
conceptual foundation to explore the relationship between
CEO characteristics and different corporate philanthropic
causes following organizational crises. In addition, this
study will extend the current understanding of how certain
CEO characteristics can be related to a firm’s philanthropic
strategy. Through a thorough literature review, seven pro-
positions are presented. This study then continues with
discussion and implications and concludes with limitations
and directions for future research.
Theory and hypothesis development
Corporate philanthropy and CSR
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to ‘‘economi-
cally sustainable business activities that go beyond legal
requirements to protect the well-being of employees, com-
munities, and the environment’’ (Heslin and Ochoa, 2008:
126). Corporate philanthropy represents ‘‘a discretionary
manifestation of CSR that differs in kind from the obliga-
tion with economic, legal, or moral dimensions of CSR’’
(Carroll, 1991: 41). For example, corporate philanthropy
includes gifts, such as time and monetary contributions
given by corporations to social and charitable causes,
including those associated with education, culture, the arts,
minorities, health care, and disaster relief (Choi and Wang,
2007; Godfrey, 2005). Importantly, both are not mutually
exclusive and the similarity between two is taking care of
others. The difference is that the former seems to broadly
focus on other issues that affect the environment, consu-
mers, and human right for the good of the world, but the
latter seems to narrowly focus on helping others by chari-
table giving and time.
Corporate philanthropy and reputation management
The increasing importance of corporate philanthropy and a
firm’s reputation is well-documented in the CSR literature
(Brammer and Millington, 2006; Godfrey, 2005; Williams
and Barrett, 2000). Corporate reputation refers to a cogni-
tive representation of a company’s actions and results that
crystallizes the firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes,
such as financial, social, and environmental impacts, to its
stakeholders over time (Barnett et al., 2006; Fombrun et al.,
2000). Importantly, both corporate philanthropy and corpo-
rate reputation have a mutual relationship to support soci-
ety and act as a bridge to receive a favorable association
with stakeholders and the public. For example, past
research found that corporate philanthropy positively influ-
ences stakeholders and reputation (Brammer and Milli-
ngton, 2006; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). In addition,
corporate philanthropy might offset the negative impact
of illegal activities on reputation to some extent and help
reduce bad reputation (Muller and Kra¨uss, 2011; Williams
and Barret, 2000). Table 1 shows a summary of studies on
corporate philanthropy and reputation.
It has been suggested that corporate philanthropy helps
recover reputation induced by corporate wrongdoing, ille-
gal activities, and misconduct so that it helps mitigate a
tense of organizational crises (Williams and Barrett,
2000). An organizational crisis refers to ‘‘a low-
probability, high-impact even that threatens the viability
of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of
cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief
that decisions must be made swiftly’’ (Pearson and Clair,
1998: 60). In general, an organizational crisis is a signifi-
cant event that brings damage or harm to stakeholders, the
public, and particularly organization itself. The examples
of organizational crises mainly include product recalls and
lawsuits because both are the most sensitive and high
impact that can threaten organizations. Table 2 below
shows the cases of high profile organizational crises.
Overview of causes of corporate philanthropy
Porter and Kramer (2002) suggest that firms engage in
corporate philanthropy with different purposes in order to
build reputation. Broadly, firms have three different pur-
poses (such as communal obligation, goodwill building,
and strategic giving) of philanthropy for the following:
First, communal obligation refers to support of civic, welfare,
and educational organizations, motivated by the company’s
desire to be a good citizen. Second, goodwill building refers
to contributions to support causes favored by employees, cus-
tomers, or community leaders, often necessitated by the desire
to improve the company’s relationships. Third, strategic giv-
ing refers to philanthropy focused on enhancing competitive
context. (Porter and Kramer, 2002: 13)
Table 1. A summary of studies on corporate philanthropy and reputation.
Study Orientation Sample Key findings/arguments
Bae and
Cameron
(2006)
Empirical Seventy-two undergraduate students
(between-subject experiment
design)
Prior corporate reputation, one responsibility of a public relation
department affects public perceptions toward corporate
philanthropic messages and ultimately affects public attitudes
toward the company
Brammer and
Pavelin
(2005)
Conceptual Social investments, such as corporate philanthropy, are a form of
insurance in that they protect the value of a company’s
reputation asset from the harm that accompanies events that
are perceived by stakeholders as indicators of social
irresponsibility
Brammer and
Milington
(2005)
Empirical Ten largest firms in 24 industrial
sectors in the United Kingdom
Companies which make higher levels of philanthropic
expenditures have better reputations and this effect varies
significantly across industries
Dean (2003) Empirical University students (laboratory
experimental design)
The average firm enhanced its image by pursuing an unconditional
donation, but a conditional donation did not damage the firm’s
image
Godfrey
(2005)
Conceptual A reputation for corporate philanthropy can help protect a firm’s
relationships with its stakeholders and thus reduce the firm’s
risk of losing critical resources
Meijer (2009) Empirical Five charitable organizations The reputation of a charity is an important factor in attracting
donors
Muller and
Kra¨uss
(2011)
Empirical Four hundred and forty-two fortune
500 firms
Reputation for social irresponsibility was associated with both the
greatest drop in stock prices and the greatest likelihood of
making a subsequent charitable donation in response to the
disaster
Lii and Lee
(2012)
Empirical Four hundred and ninety-two
undergraduate students
CSR initiatives, such as sponsorship, cause-related marketing, and
philanthropy, have a significant effect on customer-company
identification and brand attitude
Porter and
Kramer
(2002)
Conceptual The company that initiates corporate philanthropy in a particular
area will often get disproportionate benefits because of the
superior reputation and relationships it builds. However, if a
company’s philanthropy only involved its own interests, after
all, it would not qualify as a charitable deduction, and it might
well threaten the company’s reputation
Porter and
Kramer
(2006)
Conceptual The philanthropy will have a real impact on the company’s long-
term success, and the company’s giving will deliver far greater
benefits to society, to the people it is trying to help
Reinstein and
Riener
(2012)
Empirical Eighty males and 112 females
(laboratory experiments)
Leaders are influential only when their identities are revealed
along with their donations, and female leaders are more
influential than males
Williams and
Barrett
(2000)
Empirical 184 Fortune 500 firms from 1991
through 1994
Firms that violate EPA regulations should, to some extent,
experience a decline in their reputations, while firms that
contribute to charitable causes should see their reputations
enhanced
Wang and
Qian (2011)
Empirical Chinese firms listed on stock
exchanges from 2001 to 2006
The positive philanthropy performance relationship is stronger
for firms with greater public visibility and for those with better
past performance, as philanthropy by these firms gains more
positive stakeholder responses
CSR: corporate social responsibility.
Some firms engage in corporate philanthropy with the
first purpose which may not be related to their businesses.
Other firms engage in corporate philanthropy with the sec-
ond and third purpose, both of which are more likely related
to their businesses so that they attempt to connect their
charitable contributions to their business activities. With
the three different purposes of corporate philanthropy, this
study develops two causes of philanthropy: BRP and cause-
related philanthropy (CRP).
BRP, commonly known as strategic philanthropy,
refers to
an activity of a firm that involves choosing how it will volun-
tarily allocate resources to charitable or social service activi-
ties in order to reach marketing and other business-related
objectives for which they are no clear social expectations as
to how the firm should perform. (Ricks, 2002: 117)
It would be designed to contribute to direct monetary
gain, just as are other functions of the firm (Sa´nchez, 2000).
For example, corporations undertake philanthropy as long
as direct economic benefits can be gained by doing so
(Bock, 1984). Therefore, BRP explicitly links its philan-
thropic strategy with a corporate objective. CRP, called
business-unrelated philanthropy, refers to one where the
activities have nothing to do with advancing the mission
(Porter and Kramer, 2002). Firms engage in nonbusiness
charitable activities without concern for reward (Lantos,
2002). In general, the altruistic type of corporate philan-
thropy can be considered CRP (Sharfman, 1994; Useem,
1984). For instance, charitable contributions are not related
to the business objectives such that they only can generate
social benefits (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Table 3 shows
the examples of BRP and CRP.
In conclusion, it can be suggested that corporate philan-
thropy has a mutual relationship with a firm’s reputation so
it helps reduce a tense of organizational crises. In addition,
it can be suggested that a firm’s philanthropic engagement
consists of two causes, such as BRP and CRP. Recent
research suggests that organizations are social entities
where decisions are made by actors with various interests
(Gautier and Pache, 2015). Accordingly, it is important to
examine the relationship between organizational leaders
and corporate philanthropy.
In the following section, this study will look at the role
of executives on corporate philanthropy. Interestingly,
CEOs view corporate philanthropy as a legitimate perqui-
site of leadership (Barnard, 1996). Past research argues that
a firm’s strategic decisions of philanthropic engagement
mainly depend on CEOs (Porter and Kramer, 2002). To
reflect an important role of CEO on corporate philanthropy,
this study will specifically explore the link between CEO
characteristics and corporate philanthropy.
The role of organizational leaders and
corporate philanthropy
Corporate philanthropy is part of strategies that organiza-
tional leaders implement (Porter and Kramer, 2002) and
they have an important role in terms of a firm’s philanthro-
pic engagement. The predominant discussion of organiza-
tional leaders and corporate philanthropy has been on board
of directors (BODs) (Bear et al., 2010; Kabongo et al.,
2013; Williams, 2003), top managers (Choi and Wang,
2007; Rahbek Pedersen and Neergaard, 2009) and CEOs
(Chin et al., 2013; Dennis et al., 2009; Jiraporn and Chin-
trakarn, 2013; Li et al., 2015).
Several scholars have had an interest in the relationship
between BODs and corporate philanthropy (Cha and
Abebe, 2016; Kabongo et al., 2013; Williams, 2003). They
found that firms having more inside directors, a higher
proportion of female directors, and diverse BODs do
engage in corporate philanthropy more. It has been sug-
gested that ‘‘the values of top management have an imprint
on the firm, influencing decision-making processes, stake-
holder salience, and corporate social performance’’ (Rah-
bek Pedersen and Neergaard, 2009: 1263). In addition,
Choi and Wang (2007: 345) suggested that ‘‘top managers
with benevolence and integrity values are more likely to
spread their intrinsic concern for others into the wider soci-
ety in the form of corporate philanthropy.’’
Other scholars have focused on CEO characteristics
(e.g. CEO’s integrity and altruism, and CEO tenure) to
explain a firm’s philanthropic decisions (e.g. Dennis
et al., 2009; Godfrey, 2005). For example, CEO personal
values and priorities often shape the giving practices in
many public companies such that CEOs’ influence over the
specific corporate giving is very much alive and well (Chin
et al., 2013; Choi and Wang, 2007). Importantly, CEOs
view corporate philanthropy as a legitimate perquisite of
leadership (Barnard, 1996). This is because having busi-
ness legitimacy is important part of corporate strategies so
CEOs value it the most. From this, it is suggested that CEO
characteristics and personal network might explain how
firms gain business legitimacy through corporate philan-
thropy. It might be anticipated that institutional pressures
Table 2. Cases of high profile organizational crises.
Cases Description
Dukes versus
Walmart stores
Sexual discrimination class-action lawsuit
for denied promotion filed in 2000 by
Betty Dukes and other former female
employees
BP oil spill BP Oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010-
largest accidental oil spill in the
Petroleum industry. In November 2012,
BP settled criminal charges with
Department of Justice for around
US$4 billion
Merck Merck’s Vioxx (Painkiller drug) product
liability lawsuit filed in 2006 by a John
McDarby resulted in US$4.5 million
punitive fines after the jury finds that
company intentionally misled FDA
Johnson & Johnson Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol-related death
in Chicago due to product tampering
(cyanide poisoning)
Source: The Wall Street Journal and http://www.businessinsurance.com.
from personal network with which CEOs are connected can
encourage a firm’s philanthropic engagement. Table 4
below indicates a summary of research on organizational
leadership and corporate philanthropy.
CEO characteristics and corporate philanthropy
Since CEO unethical behaviors made Enron field for bank-
ruptcy in 2001, CEO ethical values and attitudes have been
recognized as an important aspect when thinking about
CSR activities. Therefore, it is important to examine how
CEOs ethical behavior is transferred to stakeholder’s con-
cern, in turn influencing a firm’s philanthropy. In addition,
past research suggests that CEOs are willing to use their
personal network as the best available information which
helps them to decide a better strategic plan (Burt, 2000).
Therefore, it might be anticipated that CEO network can be
considered a useful strategic means when making a firm’s
philanthropic engagement.
CEOs are interested in a firm’s philanthropic activities
due to the social responses to the communities in which the
firm operates (Berman et al., 1999; Wood and Jones, 1995)
and an activity that stimulates goodwill toward companies
within those communities (Brammer and Millington,
2005). Importantly, there is empirical evidence that CEOs’
integrity and altruism are positively associated with CSR
(Adams and Hardwirk, 1998;Waldman et al., 2006). Trans-
formational leadership (Bass, 1997) can support a theore-
tical foundation of this relationship. For example,
charismatic leaders maintain deeply held personal values
(such as integrity, justice, and ethics), reflecting a helping
concern for others and providing motivational effects with
others (Kanungo, 2001; Waldman et al., 2006). More spe-
cifically, several scholars suggest that founder CEOs often
exhibit deep personal attachment and passion for their
firms so they have a high social capital, reputation, and
goodwill among external stakeholders of the firm (Bamford
et al., 2006; Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Ling et al., 2007;
Nelson, 2003).
As part of important CEO characteristics, CEO network
linked with external stakeholders would appear to be a
powerful means to develop a competitive advantage for
their firms (Bamford et al., 2006). CEO network represents
the system of relationships that the CEO has with organiza-
tional members and other actors outside of their organiza-
tion (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). Because the
existence of external board members can offer the link to
other organizations, such as channels for communication
and support from external organization (Hillman and Dal-
ziel, 2003; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), CEOs tend to serve
outside boards to reduce information asymmetry and to
maximize business benefits. For example, CEOs serving
on outside boards may offer valuable strategic advice to
cope with a variety of problems that their firms may
encounter during growth (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001;
Rindova, 1999). Therefore, it can be suggested that CEOs
serving on outside boards help gain a peer relationship with
other CEOs so that CEOs can get exposed to other man-
agement styles which can affect overall business plan.
Importantly, CEO network can reflect a channel to exist-
ing social causes and needs which subsequently link to
corporate philanthropy. Past research suggests that the net-
work of contacts among organizations within a field can
drive organizations toward isomorphism and that individ-
uals in structurally similar positions are expected to express
similar perceptions and attitudes (Galaskiewicz and Burt,
1991; Zucker, 1987). In detail, a professional community
(e.g. corporate boards) can have a social structure of mul-
tiple positions, each with its own, internally producing
beliefs and attitudes about professional works. Extending
this logic, it can be suggested that CEO network is more
likely related to corporate philanthropy because CEOs ser-
ving on outside boards may tend to have a similar norm and
interest as well as causes with serving firms in terms of a
firm’s philanthropic decisions.
In conclusion, it can be suggested that CEOs engage in
corporate philanthropy to meet social responses to the com-
munities and goodwill toward their firms. Notably,
Table 3. Overview of BRP and CRP.
BRP CRP
Definition An effective corporate giving that can reach marketing and
business-related objectives and that benefit serve business
interests.
Advancing the mission and charitable contributions
unrelated to the business and generating only social
benefits
Concepts Something to do with business and shareholders focused. Nothing to do with business and stakeholders focused
Purpose It is where a given objective is closely related to a
corporation’s core activities.
It is only where corporate expenditure produces
simultaneous social and economic gains so that corporate
philanthropy and shareholder interests converge.
The desired benefit is enhanced good will, not improvement
in a company’s ability to compete.
It is generating goodwill and positive publicity and boosting
employee morale.
Cases Since 2010, Walmart has provided cash and food to fight
hunger together at the local, state, and national level
(http://www.foundation.walmart.com).
SAP (multinational company) has donated free software to
local organizations in South Africa and it meets firms’
long-term strategy as tech hubs from India to Africa,
‘‘Value creation’’ (http://www.tripundit.com).
The Coca-Cola company donated US$6 million aimed at
improving the lives of an estimated 250,000 women and
girls on the African continent in 2011(http://www.csrwire.
com).
BP (oil giant) donated US$1 million to American Red Cross
and The Salvation Army in 2012 (http://www.
huffingtonpost.com).
Note: Cases were obtained from each firm’s website and The Wall Street Journal. BRP: business-related philanthropy; CRP: cause-related philanthropy.
corporate philanthropy is highly related to CEOs’ moral
capital (ethical, integrity, and justice) which is a fundamen-
tal element for receiving a favorable response from publics.
Specifically, charismatic leadership that founder CEOs
have highly links with their ethical values, reflecting a
helping concern for stakeholders. In addition, CEO net-
work may offer the same norm and causes of philanthropy
as serving firms do. Therefore, it can be suggested
that certain CEO characteristics are closely related to a
firm’s philanthropic causes.2 In the following section,
this study will explore the relationship between CEO
characteristics (such as founder status and CEO net-
work) and causes of philanthropy, particularly when
organizational crises occur. Figure 1 below shows a
theoretical model of this study.
CEO founder status and CRP
The literature reviewed suggests that firms can have differ-
ent causes of philanthropy, such as BRP and CRP. Specif-
ically, this study suggests that founder CEOs will engage in
CRP more than non-founder CEOs for the following rea-
sons. First, founder CEOs have more commitment to the
firm than non-founder CEOs. For example, founder CEOs
contribute almost everything they have for their firm so that
such contributions will lead the founders to be more
strongly identified with and committed to the firm than
Table 4. A summary of research on organizational leadership and corporate philanthropy.
Studies Theory Focus Sample Key findings/arguments
Brown et al.
(2006)
Agency BODs Two hundred and seven fortune
500 in 1998
Firms with larger BODs are associated with
significantly more cash giving and with the
establishment of corporate foundations
Campbell
et al.
(1999)
Stakeholder Managers One hundred and thirty-nine
food distributors and
producers
The human element of personal attitudes may
interact and play a very important role in a firm’s
decision to become involved with philanthropic
activities
Chin et al.
(2013)
Upper
echelons
CEOs Two hundred and forty-nine
CEOs of S&P 1500 firms
between 2004 and 2006
Compared with conservative CEOs, liberal CEOs
exhibit greater advances in CSR initiatives. The
influence of CEOs’ political liberalism on CSR
initiatives (civic and philanthropic activities) is
amplified when they have more power
Choi and
Wang
(2007)
Stakeholder Top
management
Conceptual Top managers with benevolence and integrity
values are more likely to spread their intrinsic
concern for others into the wider society in the
form of corporate philanthropy
Dennis et al.
(2009)
Theory of
planned
behavior
CEOs Four hundred and ninety-nine
CEOs from publicly held US
firms in 2004
The most important determinant of a firm’s
philanthropy is the degree to which the CEO
identifies himself or herself as a philanthropist
Galaskiewicz
(1997)
Institutional Managers The city of Minneapolis Managers making decisions about corporate
philanthropy are subject to institutional pressure
to give in a certain way—both personal
interaction and corporate reputation
Ibrahim and
Angelidis
(1995)
Upper
echelons
BODs Three hundred and ninety-eight
corporate directors
Compared to their male counterparts, female
directors exhibit a stronger orientation toward
the discretionary component (philanthropy) of
CSR. Male board members, on the other hand,
are more concerned with the economic
component of CSR
Kabongo
et al.
(2013)
Resource
dependence
CEOs/BODs Four thousand, four hundred
and thirty-eight US firms
between 1991 to 2009
Firms with diverse BODs and female CEOs have a
positive effect on the level of corporate
philanthropy
Marquis and
Lee (2013)
Upper
echelons
BODs Fortune 500 firms during the
period 1996–2006
Characteristics of senior management and
directors affect corporate philanthropic
contributions. For example, the shorter CEO
tenure, the higher female directors, and the
more central director interlock network will be
higher corporate philanthropic contributions
Werbel and
Carter
(2002)
CEOs All US corporate foundations
with assets greater than two
million dollars
CEO’s extensive network, as measured by
membership in different nonprofit organizations,
is associated with foundation charitable giving
Williams
(2003)
Stakeholder BODs One hundred and righty-five
firms from Fortune 500 for
the 1991–1994 time period
Firms having a higher proportion of women serving
on boards do engage in charitable giving to a
greater extent than firms having a lower
proportion of women serving on their boards
BOD: board of director; CSR: corporate social responsibility.
non-founder CEOs (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). The logic
is that the more commitment CEOs have in their firms, the
more they want their firms to meet publics’ expectation
which is highly correlated with corporate philanthropy.
On the other hand, non-founder CEOs are more likely to
be obsessed by managerial hubris so they may neglect to
pay attention to the continuing commitment. Since CRP is
more likely to generate goodwill and positive publicity,
focusing on stakeholders, founder CEOs’ continuing com-
mitment will be more likely to match with CRP.
Second, founder CEOs’ interest is directly connected
with their firm. Therefore, their intrinsic motivation is bet-
ter motivated to affect stakeholders in a long-term perspec-
tive, including the continuing commitment by business to
behave ethically. For example, past research suggests that
founder CEOs with moral values tend to give more effort to
social activities, in fact positively influencing a long-term
value of their firms (Hernandez, 2008). In addition, it has
been suggested that founder CEOs often have a high social
capital, reputation, and goodwill among external stake-
holders of the firm (Bamford et al., 2006; Fischer and Pol-
lock, 2004; Nelson, 2003). CRP is a firm’s charitable
activities which are less likely to be associated with advan-
cing core business activities (Porter and Kramer, 2002).
Therefore, CRP is more likely to offer social benefits and
represents the company’s desire to be a good citizen in a
long-term perspective. Accordingly, this study states the
following proposition:
Proposition 1: CEO founder status will be positively
related to CRP such that founder-led firms will invest
more in CRP than non-founder-led firms.
CEO network breadth and CRP
Past research found that the network among external orga-
nizations can function as valuable strategic advice,
information, and support to firms (Carpenter and Westphal,
2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Rindova, 1999; Salancik
and Pfeffer, 1978). Importantly, the CEO as the ultimate
decision maker for the firm tends to maintain their network
either extensively or intensively. For example, some CEOs
might have intensive network (depth) within their industry,
and others have extensive network (breadth) outside their
industry (Ozman, 2006; Rowley and Baum, 2008). In addi-
tion, past research suggests that corporate philanthropy
includes two causes, such as business related and nonbusi-
ness related (Porter and Kramer, 2002; Ricks, 2002). From
this, it might be anticipated that there is a certain relation-
ship between two types of CEO network and two causes of
philanthropy. Specifically, this study suggests that CEO
network breadth will be positively related to CRP for the
following reasons.
CEOs’ interpretation of the environment can be a result
of their personal contacts as well as relationships with their
social network. For example, it has been found that CEOs
with broad network ties are exposed to broad information
environment (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Saiia et al., 2003),
which helps enable them to generate goodwill and social
benefits beyond business interests. In addition, past
research suggests that CEOs’ extra industry network (e.g.
network outside their industry, ‘‘breadth’’) is positively
associated with the adoption of nonconforming business
strategy (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997), which
includes charitable contributions unrelated to their busi-
nesses. Furthermore, it has been suggested that CEOs with
network breadth can strive to satisfy diverse stakeholders’
interests, providing social benefits in the long-term per-
spective (Saiia et al., 2003). CEO network breadth can
provide firms with social benefits and focus on stake-
holders’ interests (Porter and Kramer, 2002), and CRP is
not closely related to business objectives and provides only
social benefits in the long term. Accordingly, this study
states the following proposition:
P1+
P4c-
P2+
P4b-
P3+
P4a+
Business related 
philanthropy
(BRP)
CEO founder
status
Organizational crises
Cause related 
philanthropy
(CRP)
CEO network
breadth
CEO network
depth
Figure 1. A proposed theoretical model.
Proposition 2: CEO network breadth will be positively
related to CRP.
CEO network depth and BRP
This study suggests that CEO network depth will be posi-
tively related to BRP for the following reasons. First, an
intensive network (depth)3 can enable CEOs to access rich
and timely information about the firm’s internal and exter-
nal environment related to their businesses. Therefore,
CEO network depth can offer a deeper understanding of
the firm’s exploitative and exploratory options (Mehra
et al., 2006), which include other firms’ philanthropic deci-
sions. Second, past research suggests that CEOs with net-
work depth are exposed to restricted task environments
which make CEOs focus on corporation core activities
rather than general environments (Abebe et al., 2010; Wil-
liamson and Cable, 2003). For example, CEOs’ intra-
industry network (e.g. network within their industry) tends
to focus on the immediate task environments (e.g. custom-
ers, suppliers, and competitor sectors) rather than general
environments (e.g. social causes and needs as well as
humanitarian needs). Extending this logic, it might be
anticipated that CEO network depth is highly related to a
firm’s philanthropic activities which are related to eco-
nomic gains and shareholders’ interests. Third, CEO net-
work depth can influence resource allocation in
philanthropy as CEOs seek to achieve isomorphism in their
businesses. For instance, CEOs serving outside boards
within their industry could only focus on philanthropic
expenditures that are closely related to same objectives and
benefits as serving firms do.
CEO network depth can offer business benefits based on
task environments, and BRP is closely related to share-
holder values which are simultaneous social and economic
gains under corporation’s core objectives. Accordingly,
this study states the following proposition:
Proposition 3: CEO network depth will be positively
related to BRP.
Organizational crises and CEO network
Past research suggests that corporate philanthropy has
been strategically used to restore reputation induced by
organizational crises (Williams and Barrett, 2000; Ricks,
2005). In times of crisis, CEOs might need to manage
crises by adjusting a firm’s strategic decisions, including
philanthropic contributions. This study suggests that the
relationship between CEO network and causes of philan-
thropy will change when CEOs feel organizational pres-
sure caused by unexpected organizational crises for the
following reasons.
Threat rigidity theory indicates that individuals experi-
encing crises tend to have a limitation of the information
that can or will be received; as a result, crises lead them to
focus on primitive forms of reaction (Staw et al., 1981).
Therefore, during organizational crises with which
decisions must be coped quickly, CEOs of successful firms
restrict information search and attention to the task envir-
onments (such as customers, suppliers, and competitor
sectors). Importantly, it might be anticipated that
information-related crisis management (e.g. how other
firms deal with similar cases) can be obtained through CEO
network depth within their industry. CEOs might become
conservative in their resource allocation decisions in phi-
lanthropy when organizational crises occur. Extending this
logic, this study suggests that the relationship between
CEO network depth and BRP will increase in times of
organizational crises. This is because CEOs will put more
effort on how corporate expenditures (e.g. philanthropic
donations) would meet and/or maximize business interests
rather than public concern. Accordingly, this study states
the following proposition:
Proposition 4a: Organizational crises will positively
moderate the relationship between CEO network depth
and BRP such that the level of BRP will be higher after
crises.
CEOs might reduce spending financial resources to non-
essential causes when organizational crises occur. In a sit-
uation where CEOs feel organizational pressure caused by
external organizational crises, they tend to emphasize their
key shareholders’ concern in specific. In doing so, CEOs
need to change strategic pattern from general environments
(e.g. less likely to do with stakeholders focused) in a long-
term perspective to task environments (e.g. something to do
with businesses and shareholders focused) in a short-term
perspective. In addition, CEO network breadth outside their
industry is highly related to social benefits rather than busi-
ness benefits so that it may not provide firms with the
immediate cure to reduce the impact of organizational
crises. Therefore, this study states the following
proposition:
Proposition 4b: Organizational crises will negatively
moderate the relationship between CEO network
breadth and CRP such that the level of CRP will be
lower after crises.
The same argument can be applied to the relationship
between founder status and CRP when organizational
crises occur. Past research suggests that founder CEOs tend
to have high commitments for their firms, and they tend to
be more strongly identified with and committed to their
firms than non-founder CEOs (Arthurs and Busenitz,
2003). When organizational crises occur, these character-
istics can motivate founder CEOs to quickly respond to
crises so that founder CEOs can change a firm’s philan-
thropic causes from CRP to BRP. In addition, to reduce
shareholders’ tensions to organizational crises, founder
CEOs could quickly change social value-led philanthropy
to business profit-led philanthropy. Therefore, this study
states the following proposition:
Proposition 4c: Organizational crises will negatively
moderate the relationship between CEO founder
status and CRP such that the level of CRP will be
lower after crises.
Discussion and implications
When discussing a firm’s decisions about philanthropic
contributions, an examination of CEO characteristics has
become important in light of moral collapses of senior
executives in businesses, including what Enron experi-
enced when it filed for bankruptcy in 2001. To meet the
demands of the times, this study has examined the relation-
ship between CEO characteristics and corporate philan-
thropy, particularly when organizational crises occur.
Specifically, this study has focused on two types of CEO
characteristics, including founder status and CEO network.
In addition, this study has focused on different causes of
philanthropy, including CRP and BRP. This study has sug-
gested that there will be a positive relationship between
CEO characteristics and causes of philanthropy and that
relationship will vary, particularly when organizational
crises occur.
This study has contributed to a number of suggestions
and theoretical framework to the field of strategic leader-
ship and the CSR literature. First, this study has suggested
that founder CEOs with moral values can give more effort
to social benefits, in fact affecting causes (e.g. nonbusiness
related) of corporate philanthropy. This suggestion is con-
sistent with an argument that corporate philanthropy can be
the direct result of top managers’ benevolence and integrity
values, in fact building trusting relationships with stake-
holders (Choi and Wang, 2007). Second, this study has
suggested that CEO network as a means of CEO strategic
connections among organizations is closely related to dif-
ferent causes (e.g. either business related or nonbusiness
related) of philanthropy. Third, this study has suggested
that CEOs have become conservative in their resource allo-
cation decisions particularly when they sense organiza-
tional crises. To meet the threat, CEOs could focus on
business and task environments by engaging more in CRP.
This study has also provided three important implica-
tions for the following. First, this study has indicated that
causes of philanthropy can be closely linked with CEOs’
intrinsic motivation and high commitment to the firm. For
example, when firms engage more in non-BRP, stake-
holders can recognize to what degree CEOs are willing to
put their firm’s limited resources to social values. There-
fore, it can be argued that CEOs’ engagement in different
causes of philanthropy, such as socially and morally favor-
able causes (e.g. CRP) or economically favorable causes
(e.g. BRP), would act as an important indicator through
which stakeholders can determine to what degree CEOs
have commitment to the firm, in fact increasing social rec-
ognition for the firm in the long-term value.
Second, this study has indicated that CEOs can share
similar perceptions and/or attitudes from their business net-
work which can influence the causes of philanthropy. Past
research also suggests that CEOs in structurally similar
positions within their business network are expected to
express similar norm through institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and influence a firm’s deci-
sions of philanthropic contributions (Galaskiewicz and
Burt, 1991). Therefore, it can be argued that CEO network
explains why there are certain firms which engage in sim-
ilar causes of philanthropy.
Third, this study has indicated that CEO network can
provide firms with effective crisis management in times of
organizational crisis. In other words, CEO network can
help firms strategically adjust their resource allocation in
charitable contributions through causes of philanthropy.
Past research suggests that CEOs strategically use corpo-
rate philanthropy (Ricks, 2005) and CEO network can be
considered a means of a firm’s strategic tool. Accordingly,
it can be argued that CEOs apply their network to causes of
philanthropy so that their firms can restore reputation
induced by organizational crises.
Limitations and future research
This study has a number of limitations that need to be
addressed in further studies. First, it is reasonable to pro-
viding empirical evidence on the theoretical framework of
this study by measuring four distinguished concepts (such
as CEO network breadth, CEO network depth, CRP, and
BRP).4 This attempt can enhance foundation methodologi-
cally on the study’s theoretical framework in Figure 1.
Second, it is recommended that there is a need to include
boundaries beyond organizational crises. For example,
managerial misconducts or illegal activities (Haley, 1991)
might need to be included. Meanwhile, national crises
(such as financial crises and earthquakes) also need to be
included. This attempt can offer a holistic perspective of
the relationship between crisis management and corporate
philanthropy. It might be anticipated that firms engage in
causes of philanthropy differently depending on manage-
rial, organizational, and national context of crises.
Conclusion
This study has suggested that engaging in corporate philan-
thropy is no longer a discretionary action beyond what is
expected by a firm. More importantly, corporate philan-
thropy acts as a strategic tool which can reduce a pessimis-
tic view of critics, particularly when organizational crises
occur. In addition, this study has suggested that determin-
ing targets and/or causes of philanthropic activities are
closely related to certain CEO characteristics. For example,
founder CEOs with moral value and intrinsic motivation to
the firm would put more effort into social benefits within a
long-term orientation for their firm, and their value and
motivation can be fulfilled by engaging in CRP more.
Furthermore, this study has suggested that CEO network
would act as a meaningful signal through which stake-
holders can acknowledge how well CEOs address a firm’s
philanthropic policy within similar institutions. Overall,
this study can provide firms with a strategic leadership
guide in engaging in philanthropy but also motivate them
to engage in philanthropy more although they are in
bad mood.
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Notes
1. In this article, organizational pressure refers to ‘‘the external
factors which cause staff anxiety and restlessness’’ (Yang and
Yang, 2014: 14). We believe that CEOs tend to proactively
take steps to their organizations to organizational crises by
addressing a firm’s philanthropic strategy. In detail, when fac-
ing organizational pressure caused by unexpected organiza-
tional crises, CEOs could reframe a firm’s philanthropic
strategy so as to recover reputation as well as generate positive
organizational change.
2. In this article, it might be better to say that causes of philan-
thropy rather than philanthropic motivations would be more
appropriate since the main point of this article is that certain
CEO characteristics are closely related to (determine) different
causes of philanthropy and the relationship could change when
CEOs feel organizational pressure caused by unexpected orga-
nizational crises.
3. CEO network helps facilitate information flow (developing
from the CEOs’ presence on the other firm’s boards) to CEOs
so it helps play a considerable role in the decision process. In
addition, CEO intensive network (network depth) among man-
agerial elites in similar industry helps CEOs to seek informa-
tion from sources that are more likely to affirm those beliefs.
4. While this study offered a theoretical foundation on the rela-
tionship between certain CEO characteristics and causes of
philanthropy under organizational crises, this might be consid-
ered as less convincing without having empirical evidence. As
future study, one plausible way to measure cause-related phi-
lanthropy and business-related philanthropy (BRP) would be
to distinguish between cash giving and gifts in-kind giving
from the total corporate philanthropic activities. As opposed
to cash giving, it might be suggested that gifts in-kind giving
may be highly related to firms’ strategic purposes and missions
so that it may genuinely reflect the level of BRP.
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